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This elegant and intriguing book might be called ‚A Tale of Two Concepts.‛  The concepts are 
free speech and shame, or rather, the ancient Greek terms that are typically rendered into 
English as ‚free speech‛ and ‚shame‛: the first of these is parrhêsia, the second aidôs.  Both are 
central notions in the political thought of classical Greece, and have been studied indepen-
dently as representative values.  Saxonhouse’s contribution is to bring them together, and to 
treat classical parrhêsia precisely as indifference to aidôs, that is, shame in the sense of respect 
for tradition and public opinion, a word sometimes translated as ‚reverence‛ or even ‚awe.‛  
If freedom of speech is the hallmark of democracy—and it was indeed conceived as such in 
classical Athens—then democracy would seem to imply, on this account, a neglect of shame or 
the views of others, which is all very well if we are thinking of a kind of rugged individualism 
that speaks its mind fearlessly and has nothing to conceal.  But shamelessness has also a nega-
tive side, insofar as it suggests a disregard of others’ needs or interests, and may enable or 
excuse not just honest candour but deviousness and deceit.  How Athenians managed this ten-
sion (insofar as we can judge from the texts that survive), and what it might have to teach us 
about free speech today—which is not exactly the same thing as parrhêsia—is the subject of 
Saxonhouse’s book. 
Freedom of speech, as understood in modern representative democracies, and above all 
in the United States, has its origins in the opposition to the powers of the state; Saxonhouse 
quotes James Madison’s affirmation that ‚the great object in view is to limit and qualify the 
powers of Government,‛ and the idea goes back ultimately to Milton’s famous tract, Areopa-
gitica: A Speech for the Liberty of Unlicenc’d Printing. (17)  Defenses of free speech are cast in 
terms of checking or curbing the authorities so as to protect citizens’ rights: it is a bulwark 
against the tyranny of the state.  All this makes sense in a system of representative govern-
ment, where elected individuals have great power over their fellow countrymen and the views 
of minorities and opposition groups need to be protected.  But the ancient Athenian demo-
cracy was quite different.  Saxonhouse quotes Thomas Jefferson’s bold claim: 
 
The introduction of this principle of representative democracy has rendered useless almost 
everything written before on the structure of government; and in great measure, relieves our 
regret, if the political writings of Aristotle, or of any other ancient, have been lost, or are 
unfaithfully rendered or explained. (13) 
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In the classical Athenian democracy, the people were the government, and hence ‚there will 
be no reference to an ‘oppressive government’ against which the people, the dêmos, need to 
protect themselves.‛ (23)  When Barack Obama affirmed, ‚When our government is spoken of 
as some menacing, threatening foreign entity, it ignores the fact that, in our democracy, 
government is us,‛ he was of course right to deny that government is necessarily an adversary 
of the people it represents, but wrong to assimilate the modern state to the people.  What is 
more, Saxonhouse argues that modern attempts to distinguish between public and private 
speech are irrelevant to the Athenian democracy: free speech there had nothing to do with 
individualism or self-development or toleration of diversity, nor was it a safety valve for 
popular discontent or a window onto the sentiments of the lower classes; the Athenians were 
not interested in rights, but in equality.  If democratic freedom entails a rejection of aidôs, it is 
not just shame before one’s peers that is sacrificed, but respect for whatever has gone before—
it is so wholesale a dismissal of inherited practices and values that Saxonhouse calls it amne-
sia: to create anew, one must forget the past.  Democracy is a radical experiment—permanently. 
 After the introductory chapters on the contrast between ancient and modern demo-
cracy, Saxonhouse proceeds to analyze a series of texts that exhibit the tensions entailed in the 
classical Greek conception of parrhêsia and the restraints on absolute freedom of speech repre-
sented by its opposite number, aidôs.  She begins with the tale of Gyges and Candaules’ wife, 
as told by Herodotus.  The Lydian king Candaules was enamoured of his wife, and to prove 
how beautiful she was, he ordered his chief minister, Gyges, to conceal himself in the bedroom 
so as to observe her naked; as Herodotus remarks, when a woman is seen unclothed, she is 
stripped also of aidôs.  The queen espied Gyges, and later, to avenge the insult, ordered him to 
kill Candaules, on pain of his own death should he refuse.  Thus Gyges became ruler of Lydia, 
and his line endured to the fifth generation, when Croesus was defeated by the Medes.  
Saxonhouse reads this tale as a sign of Candaules’ refusal to respect traditional values; as she 
puts it, ‚In many ways I see him as a precursor to Socrates, who also dies for showing what 
perhaps should have remained hidden, at least from the perspective of truths assumed to be 
discovered long ago.‛ (59)  This is a novel interpretation, which does indeed prefigure Saxon-
house’s view of Socrates (on which more below), but it omits some elements in the tale that 
deserve consideration.  To begin with, Candaules is said to be infatuated with his wife (the 
verb is related to erôs): this is a bad sign, and he goes on to treat her as though she were a 
courtesan rather than his legitimate spouse; if Candaules is shameless, it is under the stimulus 
of erotic passion.  Further, it is Candaules’ wife who is said to have lost her aidôs, that is, her 
respect for what is right and due, and the result is that she arranges the murder of her 
husband: is she too, then, a precursor of Socrates?  She loses her reverence for custom after she 
has been deprived of due regard–it is risky to expose others, as Socrates will discover. 
 Is aidôs shame?  And if so, shame in what sense?  Saxonhouse provides an elegant sur-
vey of modern conceptions of shame, which embraces both retrospective shame—feeling 
ashamed for something one has done—and prospective shame, that is, the sense of shame that 
inhibits one from performing an act that one might later feel ashamed of.  The distinction 
between the two ideas is clearer in the negation: to lack shame in the sense of shamelessness 
(‚he is shameless‛) is a vice, and signifies the absence of a sense of shame; however, to be free 
of shame in the sense of having done nothing of which one is ashamed is the mark of a 
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virtuous life.  Now, Aristotle, in his analysis of shame (he discusses the term aiskhunê, not 
aidôs), speaks of shame for past, present, and future deeds; for him, what inhibits us from 
committing a wrongful act is an image (phantasia) of the shame we will feel for having done it.  
Saxonhouse mentions aiskhunê only in passing, since her focus is on aidôs, but the distinction 
implicit in the classical Greek vocabulary is significant.  Thus, when Saxonhouse remarks that 
‚The blush, as the response to shame, reveals our unsuccessful wish to hide, but in the very 
process of seeking to hide ourselves, it also reveals our dependence on the opinions of others 
and thus our lives as a member of the social network,‛ she would seem to be joining together 
aidôs, as regard for social propriety, and aiskhunê, which would be the sentiment that elicits a 
blush. (76)  If we had no aidôs, we would not blush, but neither would we blush if we acted 
always in accord with aidôs: the blush is caused by aiskhunê.  Since we would not experience 
the emotion of aiskhunê (it is a pathos or emotion for Aristotle) if we lacked the values that 
underpin aidôs, Saxonhouse is right to connect the two ideas, but rendering aidôs simply as 
‚shame‛ may give a misleading impression of the way the Greeks conceived it. 
 Saxonhouse’s main argument concerns the place of shame in a liberal democratic 
society.  As she puts it, ‚The question underlying this book is: does democracy (like philo-
sophy) ...require shame, the contextual individual, or is democracy built on a transcendence of 
shame, on uncovering practices that resist shame and the history that defines what is 
shameful?‛ (77)  In a democracy, we believe in freedom of speech; but this freedom pre-
supposes ‚a practice of openness, of a refusal to hide one’s thoughts because of a shame that 
would bring humiliation or disapproval in the eyes of others.  Respect and reverence before 
the judgments of others, in contrast, limit the freedom and uncovering capacities of speech 
and opportunities for individual choice.‛ (78)  Seen this way, the character who incarnates the 
spirit of democracy is Candaules, who does as he pleases without regard for what others think 
or have thought (and his wife too, after she has been exposed and so sheds her aidôs), and, 
after him, Socrates, the man who ‚exercises the democratic virtue of parrhêsia to its fullest...: 
shedding aidôs like the Lydian women of whom Gyges spoke, he exercises it everywhere, 
whether he is in the private or public spaces of Athens.‛ (110)  Always to examine one’s life 
implies that ‚nothing is too sacred to remain covered by a deference to or reverence for what 
is.‛ (110)  Socrates’ refusal to placate the jurors when he is on trial for his life is of a piece with 
his challenge to every kind of hierarchy, human or divine—after all, he deliberately puts the 
oracle of Apollo, which declared him to be the wisest of all Athenians, to the test, buttonholing 
everyone he meets to determine whether they might in fact have more wisdom than he, since 
he knows himself to possess so little. (116)  The irony is that the Athenian democracy has 
condemned Socrates for practicing the very privilege—that of parrhêsia—that is constitutive of 
membership in a democratic polis.  Put away any thought of an elitist Socrates, for he is the 
model of a democratic citizen; it is the jurors who are violating democratic principles, precisely 
insofar as they demand that Socrates show reverence or aidôs for conventional values—any 
values, that is, since all are subject, in a democracy, to constant interrogation.  Socrates is the 
hero of shamelessness, unless perhaps (it occurs to me) we wish to regard the jurors who 
condemned him as acting shamelessly; but Saxonhouse regards them rather as bound by 
convention. 
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 Saxonhouse proceeds to examine the role of free speech and shame in drama (both 
tragedy and comedy) and Thucydides’ history of the Peloponnesian War.  Her discussion of 
Euripides’ Phoenician Women, one of the more problematic tragedies that has often been criti-
cised for its apparent shapelessness, is trenchant.  Saxonhouse observes that Eteocles, one of 
Oedipus’ sons, ‚through his own shameless parrhêsia, respectful neither of traditions nor oaths 
nor family affirms simply and without qualification that truth comes from power,‛  and so de-
termines to hold onto the throne that he had pledged to share with his brother Polyneices after 
Oedipus had blinded himself; shamelessness, then, is not necessarily bound up with demo-
cracy, or if it is, it is a democratic principle that may be turned against democracy itself. (142)  
This is a problem that is felt urgently today, as limits are placed on free speech in the osten-
sible service of protecting it (or, as someone once quipped, freedom of speech is a sacred right, 
so long as you do not exercise it).  Of Oedipus, his wife Jocasta, and her brother Creon, Saxon-
house remarks: ‚this is a family that pursues the truth and that wants speech to reveal and 
uncover, but that always ends by regretting when the speech they so forcibly demand reveals 
the truths they would rather not hear.‛ (144)   Saxonhouse subjects Thucydides’ account of the 
debate over the fate of the Mytileneans, whom the Athenians had determined to kill to the last 
man (reducing the women and children to slavery) for having withdrawn from the Athenian 
alliance, to a revisionist interpretation.  According to Saxonhouse, the brutal Cleon, who ar-
gues that the Athenians ought not to revise their decision out of facile sentimentality, becomes, 
despite his brash outspokenness and apparent contempt for public opinion (he lambasts the 
Athenians for their fickleness), an example of undue respect for the past—that is, the harsh 
judgment the Athenians arrived at on the previous day: ‚Decisions that were made in the past 
(even if it was only yesterday) must hold, he claims.‛ (154)  His opponent, Diodotus, becomes 
the speaker who looks to the future: ‚Foresight, not memory, dominates the perspective of this 
advocate of the lost art of parrhêsia.‛ (160)  Perhaps so, but there is another way to see the 
contrast between the two arguments: Cleon maintains that the severe punishment of the Myti-
leneans will deter future revolts, whereas Diodotus holds that it will rather encourage any city 
that does rebel to fight to the finish.  Both are forward looking; nevertheless, it is true that 
Cleon thinks more in terms of justice (what the Mytileneans deserve) while Diodotus stakes 
his claim on purely pragmatic grounds (what is ultimately in our best interest), which, as Aris-
totle observes, is the proper kind of argument in a political debate (deliberative oratory) as 
opposed to a courtroom (forensic oratory); and justice does involve a respect for values, 
though Saxonhouse does not put it this way.  Saxonhouse also analyzes the debates over the 
expedition to Sicily, both in Athens, where Alcibiades shamelessly appealed to the martial 
spirit of the young while Nicias emphasized the risks involved, and in Syracuse, where the 
aristocratic Hermocrates urged precautions against the coming invasion while his opponent, 
the otherwise unknown Athenagoras (whose name, I note, translates as ‚spokesman for 
Athens‛), pooh-poohs the idea that the Athenians would even contemplate such an attack.  I 
personally believe that Athenagoras was a stooge for Athens, and expected an Athenian 
victory to shore up the democratic party in Syracuse: it is hard otherwise to see what the 
advantage would be in failing to take any advance measures to defend the city, even if 
knowledge of a possible Athenian assault was still based on rumour (but whence its source?).  
Saxonhouse takes Hermocrates as ‚a blind for Thucydides’ own speech throughout the his-
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tory.‛ (173)  Perhaps so, but beyond the issue of truth and the power of free expression, one 
must remember that democratic and aristocratic (or oligarchic) factions were facing off in most 
cities, and the Athenians’ support for democratic regimes (as opposed to the Spartans’ elitist 
posture) meant that Peloponnesian War was in part waged as a proxy fight between rival 
political parties.  In such a context, everyone had something to conceal. 
 Saxonhouse concludes with a discussion of Plato’s Protagoras.  In his great speech at the 
beginning of the dialogue, Protagoras had insisted that, whereas in most areas talent is 
distributed unevenly, all people have a share in aidôs and a sense of justice, which are the twin 
bases of civic society.  But Protagoras himself, like the other sophists gathered in the house of 
Callias, is a foreigner in Athens, and so his freedom of speech or parrhêsia is limited.  This puts 
him in a bind, since his teachings encourage a critical attitude toward conventional values 
(‚man is the measure of all things‛), and thus undermine the very aidôs that he preached in his 
speech. (185)  The conversation in which he engages with Socrates is held indoors, in private; 
secrecy is needed to conduct such an inquiry.  The Athenian democracy, as we have seen, is 
not uniformly tolerant of parrhêsia.  Can Socrates offer a way in which a free conversation can 
be pursued, one that will avoid the disingenuous posturing of sophists like Protagoras, who 
pronounce grand rhetorical discourses that are belied by their own behaviour?  Saxonhouse 
believes that Socrates does so, precisely by imposing his own form (eidos) of discussion, that is, 
relatively brief questions and answers: ‚Eidos replaces aidôs,‛ she puns, and in this way ‚the 
freedom from aidôs and from the hierarchies grounded on past relations does not dissolve into 
the formless and bombastic rhetoric of Protagoras.‛ (198)  Saxonhouse argues further that So-
crates’ insistence on the unity of the virtues has as its goal ‚nothing less than to release the 
words from their bondage and to transform the way in which we speak.‛ (204)  But does the 
form of his cross-examinations inoculate his discourse against the danger of insincere speech? 
Socratic dialectic is corrosive, challenging conventional values and distinctions, and in 
this regard may be characterized as license.  Socrates’ shamelessness is presumably justified, 
in contrast to Protagoras’ posturing, by his relentless pursuit of the truth, as though a commit-
ment to truth, even when it is unpopular, itself constituted a kind of restraint or reverence.  
But can we, as Saxonhouse suggests, distinguish between a good and bad parrhêsia, depending 
on the motives of the speaker—an honest and open discourse on the one hand, or a self-
interested and deceitful parrhêsia that ‚becomes instead the practice of covering up what one 
truly believes in order to become foremost in the regime in which one lives?‛ (209)  Is this not 
to reinstall a tyranny over the freedom of speech, inasmuch as someone—but who?—will have 
to be the arbiter of genuine versus false parrhêsia?  In the conclusion, Saxonhouse describes a 
series of paradoxes that result from her investigation, and in the last of these she wonders 
aloud whether the ancient texts she has examined ‚point to the dangers in the too-ready 
dismissal of aidôs,‛ and suggests the need for ‚a sort of ‘democratic aidôs’ to replace the demo-
cratic amnesia from which democracies emerge.‛ (214)  Is democracy then truly the realm of 
shamelessness, and is this version of free speech, even if it is imagined to be in the service of 
truth, the manifestation of democracy at its best and strongest?  The lessons of antiquity seem 
ambiguous, and this hankering for a form of respect proper to democracy seems to undercut 
the radical vision of democratic parrhêsia that Saxonhouse was bold enough to introduce.  But 
perhaps true freedom implies the necessity of letting all sides speak, and works less by persua-
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sion than by clarification.  By reminding us that free speech is predicated on a kind of shame-
lessness, Saxonhouse has posed the fundamental questions of democratic discourse anew, and 
shown how readily, and perhaps inevitably, it is compromised where power is at stake. 
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